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SUMMARY 
Public Private Partnerships (PPP) have been much discussed throughout Europe, but does the practice match the 
idea of cooperating actors who achieve added value together and share risks? An analysis of three cases of PPP in 
The Netherlands suggests that practice tends to be less ideal than the idea. Actors have difficulties in achieving 
actual joint decision-making and organisation and tend to organise their interactions in a traditional way: by 
contracting out and by separating responsibilities. 
From a network perspective we will analyse the actor constellations around urban investment projects in which the 
use of PPP is discussed and elaborated. We will identify their institutional characteristics and the behavioural logic 
used by public and private actors. Despite the presence of a great many good intentions, institutional factors prevent 
parties from achieving actual partnerships. Because these factors (i.e. role attitudes, behavioural rules, perceptions 
(of each other)) cannot easily be changed – i.e. they cannot be changed by just one or two managers, but must 
become part of the culture within the actor constellations – there is still a long way to go before the idea of partner-
ship is transformed into actual practice. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF COOPERATION 
 
In the 1990’s, a discussion developed on Public-Private Partnership, both internationally (Osborne, 2000) 
and in the national policy arenas of the Netherlands (PPP Kenniscentrum [‘Dutch PPP Knowledge 
Centre’]), 1998, 1999). PPP was an important element – in rhetoric at least – of Tony Blair’s new labour 
policy, as it was in the former right-wing governments (Falconer/ McLaughlin, 2000). Even the European 
Union, which is traditionally more inclined to emphasise open markets, increased competition and the 
separation of public and private spheres, has shown an increased interest in this concept (Teisman/Klijn, 
2000). PPP has become a fashionable term over the last two decades.  
As stated by the Dutch Knowledge Centre on PPP that was set up in the late 1990’s by the Dutch Ministry 
of Finance in order to support PPP initiatives: “International experiences demonstrate that a faster and 
more efficient implementation of infrastructure projects is possible through public-private partnership 
(PPP). Both public and private actors in the Netherlands have displayed an interest and willingness for 
PPP.” (Kenniscentrum, 1998).  
 
PPP: The Added Value of a New Organisational Form  
PPP is defined as a “cooperation between public and private actors with a durable character in which 
actors develop mutual products and/or services and in which risk, costs, and benefits are shared.” In an 
ideal PPP, the traditional distinction between public and private is dissolved. So, while interaction 
between the two spheres has been going on for decades, cooperation has recently become more focused 
on mutual development and the realisation of products. 
Public and private partnership is based on the idea of mutual added value. Actors foresee additional 
benefits and expect that these will outweigh the (extra) cost of cooperation. Benefits can take a variety of 
forms: financial/material in the form of profits, working space, increased transport capacity, etc, or more 
intangibly, in terms of image, knowledge development, and so forth. The costs of cooperation can be one-
time only (preparation, adaptation of the internal organisation) or recurring (organisational co-ordination, 
adaptation and tuning of substantive objectives, etc.). But what is important is the added value of synergy, 
i.e. the possibility of developing a product through the integration of various parts or combined efforts 
that would not have been possible without such PPP.1  
 
The line of argument of this contribution 
After two decades of trying, we must come to the conclusion that PPP’s are not easy to accomplish. We 
will look for an explanation. First, the number of actors could be a problem. Secondly, the actors involved 
are likely to have different objectives, a variety of perceptions and contrasting backgrounds. Al these 
differences make cooperation difficult. Thirdly, it must be recognised that decisions are taken in separate 
arenas in various networks. This institutional fragmentation also inhibits joint decision-making. The 
various institutional backgrounds frequently result in misunderstandings, perceived risks and conflicting 
strategies. In other words, it is the network in which actors and behaviours are embedded and the charac-
teristics which have to be analysed to get an insight in the possibilities and barriers for adequate co-
operation in PPP projects. 
We will look at three PPP projects in the Netherlands and analyse the nature of the cooperation. After 
describing the network perspective in section 2, we will then present three key projects which were 
introduced by the Ministry of Finance as Dutch examples of PPP. Despite the concept of PPP, which 
involves working together and sharing risks, in section 3 we show that projects that take a long time tend 
to dissolve into different elements. There are no signs of formal commitments. Projects are organised in 
such a way that responsibilities can be separated and organised by way of contracting out. We will 
elaborate upon three major explanations for this: the variety of actors and their interdependencies in 
section 4, the institutional complexity of decision-making in section 5 and, in section 6, the value conflicts 
and resulting strategies by public and private actors.  
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2. A NETWORK PERSPECTIVE 
 
Cooperation implies an increase in the number of participants. Also. in partnerships the actors are really 
dependent on each other. These two basic conditions already create problems in themselves (viz. e.g. 
Emerson, 1962; Scharpf, 1978; Rogers and Whetten, 1992; Klijn and Teisman, 2000).  
 
Public private partnerships as network governance: interdependencies 
Achieving surplus value requires cooperation between actors. Only if they utilise their means, link their 
interests and problem definitions, and pursue mutually interesting solutions, will these actors invest in 
cooperation. Hence, to realise added value, an active investment of parties and a linking of interactions 
are required. 
This problem of cooperation is stated in a dominant manner in the network perspective on governance2. 
The network perspective assumes that policy is developed and implemented in networks of organisations 
(Rhodes, 1997; Kickert/Klijn/Koppenjan, 1997; Klijn/Koppenjan, 2000). Policy networks can be defined 
as “changing patterns of social relationships between interdependent actors which take shape around 
policy problems and/or clusters of resources and that are formed, maintained and changed by an ecology 
of games”. Networks emerge and continue to exist because actors are dependent on each other (Aldrich, 
1979; Negandhi, 1975; Milward/Wamsley, 1985). Actors cannot achieve their objectives without re-
sources which are possessed by other actors. Thus, networks are characterised by a limited substitutability 
of resources, which ensures that sustainable social relations are created between actors.  
Within these policy networks, actors conduct themselves strategically in policy processes. This theoretical 
framework sees policy processes as (a series of) games (for the concept of game, viz. Allison, 1971; 
Crozier and Friedberg, 1980; Klijn/Teisman, 1997; Scharpf, 1997). The multiplicity of actors and their 
various and often conflicting perceptions, interests and strategies make these games complex ones (see 
Klijn, 1996; Teisman, 2000, also Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972, Lindblom and Cohen, 1979).  
Games are played in arenas. Some games are more complex and are played out in several arenas at once 
(Klijn/van Bueren/Koppenjan, 2000). Arenas are the action context in which the games take place. Arenas 
can be characterised by a specific set of actors, the decision-making situation in which they find them-
selves (constellation of preferences and positions), and the organisational arrangements according to 
which decisions are made. Arenas are ‘activated game fields’ and can be located within one or more 
networks (see Figure 1). Not all the actors in networks are necessarily engaged in all the games and 
arenas. 
Games are likely to become complicated if they take place in arenas that are located in different networks, 
because this makes it more difficult to connect the various interactions. Also, in this case it will be more 
likely that different rules of behaviour are at stake (Klijn 2001). 
 
Analysing PPPs: Actors, networks, arenas and strategies 
PPPs include actors from different networks, each with their own history and regime, and are constantly 
influenced by decisions made in other arenas. Figure 1 depicts the institutional complexity of PPP. A PPP 
is created by a game that involves more than one arena (for instance central and local government) and 
more than one network (for instance, a traffic and transport network and a public housing network). At 
the same time, a game surrounding a PPP project (such as game 2) can be influenced by decisions taken 
in other games and arenas. 
In these games, each of the actors chooses his own strategy. This can make decision-making in PPPs even 
more complex, because decisions are faced not only with an institutional complexity but also with a 
strategic complexity resulting from the interactions between independently chosen strategies.  
 
Figure 1 Policy Games That Cut Through Various Policy Networks  
 
Policy network 1
arena 1
arena 3
arena 2
Policy network 2
policy game 3
policy game 2
policy game 1
 
 
Source: Klijn/Van Bueren/Koppenjan, 2000: 19. 
 
 
3.  PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN DUTCH KEY PROJECTS 
 
Part of a series of projects in the Netherlands where PPP should play an important role are the so-called 
‘Key Projects’. The concept of the ‘New Key Project’ is used by the Ministry of VROM (Housing, 
Planning and Environment) to define large-scale urban development projects which fit in with national 
spatial policy. The Key Projects policy aims to strengthen the economic structure, while at the same time 
improving environmental quality and providing a more effective use of space. Six Key Projects of urban 
redevelopment in the area of real estate, urban quality and mobility are presented as test cases for PPP 
policy: 
- The Railway Station area of Utrecht Central Station (UCP); 
- The South Axis in Amsterdam; a building site near Schiphol Airport and along a transport corri-
dor; 
- The Railway Station area of Rotterdam Central Station; 
- The Hoog Hage/Central Station area in The Hague; 
- The Railway Station area of Arnhem CentralStation/the Coehoorn Project; and 
- The Breda Rail Zone. 
 
All these projects are at the stage of conceptual development. They involve large existing office build-
ings, infrastructure and (shopping and recreational) services. Because the projects imply an invasion into 
the existing urban infrastructure, a wide variety of actors is involved with explicit and partially solidified 
interests. Frequently, investments occur during the conceptual development stage. These investments 
have consequences for urban planning. 
These invasive restructuring plans are to be realised over the next decade. These plans were adopted by 
the national government because they represent a high level of ambition and local improvement. In 
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addition to employment and improved access, the national government also wishes to realise a more 
intensive use of the existing urban space as well as revitalise social-economic activity (Kenniscentrum 
PPP, 1999). This means that many actors will be needed to achieve these ambitions.  
In this section we discuss three Key Projects: the Utrecht Centre Project, the South Axis and the Central 
Station in The Hague. We identify some characteristics of the partnerships we find here, the process of 
cooperation and the effectiveness of cooperation. 
 
Case 1: The Utrecht Center Project 
The Utrecht Centre Project (UCP)3 concerns the restructuring of the area around Utrecht Central Train 
Station including the Hoog Catharijne shopping centre in which the station is situated. It involves the 
construction of 330,000 square meters of new offices, 1,750 apartments and 61,200 square meters of 
shops, in addition to some infrastructural developments intended to open up the centre. The number of 
barriers that restrict access to the Central Station, Hoog Catharijne, and Jaarbeurs Complex (a conference 
centre) areas is to be reduced. In addition, the goal is to improve public space, for instance through the 
construction of new public squares and the improvement of existing ones, reducing the amount of water 
present in the Catharijnesingel (Catharijne Canal), and improving the infrastructure for cars and bicycles. 
Another objective is to enhance internal traffic facilities so that passengers can experience quick, efficient 
and easy travel using public transport and achieve good connections to other types of transport. Finally, a 
strengthening of economic opportunities through a concentration of activities is also mentioned as a goal 
(Project Bureau UCP, 1999).  
In the early 1980s, the national government, the Dutch national railways, the Jaarbeurs, and the owner of 
the Hoog Catharijne shopping centre drew up plans to redevelop the area. The municipality wanted to 
achieve a harmonious interaction of functions through mutual planning. After publishing a Memorandum 
of Understanding in 1988, the four parties locked hands in order to develop a master plan for the area. 
Taking into account the differences of opinion between the municipality and the three landowners, a new 
initiative was launched – after realisation of the master plan in 1993 – which involved the creation of a 
development corporation owned by the municipality and by three large project developers. None of these 
project developers had any existing interests in the area, and when initiatives by this coalition were 
blocked by the three existing actors (NS, Jaarbeurs and the owner of Hoog Catharijne) in mid-1995, the 
development corporation practically ceased functioning. The municipality once again engaged in a 
cooperative venture with the landowners in the area in early 1996. 
In December of 1997, this new venture presented a ‘Definitive City Plan Design’ (DCPD). The Municipal 
Council tentatively approved this plan in spite of growing opposition against the plan, which was politi-
cally organised by a new party called Leefbaar Utrecht (‘Liveable Utrecht’). On the basis of the DCPD, 
the landowners and building-owners took further elaboration of the plans into their own hands. Mutual 
agreements were made about investments into the ‘Public Space’, under the condition that the national 
government would contribute. With the help of an urban architectural supervisor and using Quality 
Manuals and a specially created Quality Team, guarantees were built in to monitor progress. 
In the spring of 2000, cooperation between the municipality and the private parties failed once more. The 
private parties (i.e. the Jaarbeurs and Winkelbeheer Nederland) withdrew because they felt that the 
investments they had to make in the public space were too high. Although this mid-way unravelling came 
as a surprise to many, it was only to be expected given the capricious process that had evolved over the 
years.  
Shortly after the breakup of the cooperation, Leefbaar Utrecht won the election and obtained an important 
administrative position in the local council. This party started to amend the plans, and in 2002 consulted 
the citizens with two new versions of the plan. In 2002 the version which incorporated certain ‘green’ 
qualities (more trees, restoration of canals) was accepted. Not only do several important issues regarding 
mobility and finance still need to be solved here, but we may also question the labelling of the project as a 
‘partnership’. 
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In November 2000, the urban and national public authorities produced a preliminary document containing 
various options for improvements in the infrastructure. The ‘dock model’ (rail and roads underground) 
optimised the possibilities and created the best conditions for achieving the targets set. It was, however, 
also the most expensive one. Two other models are still being worked on: a ‘dike model’ and an ‘art 
model’. The first option aims to achieve expansion without the given physical situation. In the second 
Case 2: The Amsterdam South Axis 
The ‘South Axis’ project concerns the (re)development of the area surrounding the Amsterdam 
South/WTC Railway Station and the southern part of the motorway around Amsterdam. During the 
eighties, there had been a rapid expansion of the construction of new office space in this area. One 
example is the new office of the large ABN-AMRO Bank. The City of Amsterdam had to make decisions 
on these expansions case by case, and in 1994 it wanted to develop more systematic planning for this 
area. For this purpose the City managers set up the so-called ‘South Axis Coalition’ in December 1994, in 
which all the prominent private actors took part. It was a kind of informal strategic group without any 
fixed membership. To support the coalition, a working group was set up consisting of civil servants from 
the main departments of the Amsterdam civil service in order to direct research toward possible solutions 
and start working on a master plan. A first draft of the plan was presented in October 1996. Sections of 
the master plan were discussed with interest groups in late 1996. As a result, additional housing (1,500) 
and other functions were added to the existing proposals. In 1997, the Real Estate department of the 
Dutch Railways (NS) joined this strategic group, and the partners started working together on further 
development of the plan. They paid special attention to the idea of constructing an underground infra-
structure (the motorway and heavy and light rail) in order to create possibilities aboveground for the 
construction of new offices and housing. 
This master plan was approved by the City Council in January 1998. The area would be developed into a 
high-potential area of office space and private housing combined with transport facilities. On the basis of 
this document, certain areas were already undergoing further development (such as investments in the 
large existing RAI Conference Centre which were made in February 1998, and plans for an office site 
called Mahler IV in May 1998). However, no concrete results were obtained for the financing of the 
underground transport infrastructure. The enthusiastic cooperation between city managers and private 
actors began to stagnate. They began to resume their traditional roles. Public actors felt that they needed 
to invest a great deal of time and effort to keep the process going while failing to obtain any clear 
commitments on the financial involvement of private actors. Private actors criticised the lack of involve-
ment and impact made by their efforts. 
According to previous negotiations, agreements should have been signed by early 1999. But in reality no 
agreement was reached on how to proceed further. The public-private cooperation structure began to 
unravel, and the focus shifted to the realisation of real-estate projects that were not dependent on the new 
underground car and public transport infrastructure. The public managers once again took on a central 
role in the planning process. They negotiated on a bilateral basis with several private and public actors for 
commitments, money (from public actors) or partial investment projects (with private actors). Although 
the interaction between public and private actors remained intensive, their joint organisation began to 
come apart, and responsibilities split up along traditional lines. In other words, the interaction that 
existed was used mainly for joint fact-finding, not for joint responsibility and joint decision-making. 
 
For instance, the City of Amsterdam and its central departments initiated a number of fact-finding studies 
to explore the technical and financial possibilities of locating infrastructure below the first floor. In early 
2000, the City Council (again) declared that an infrastructure should be located underground. This 
solution was expected to lead to great environmental and economic improvements. Three important 
private actors, the ING Bank, the ABN-AMRO Bank, and NS Real Estate, started to organise their 
strategies in a consortium. After some negotiations with the City of Amsterdam, they guaranteed an 
investment of 2 billion Dutch Guilders (about 630 million Euro) in real estate above the tunnel (if it was 
constructed and financed by the government). 
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Commitment, however, had been somewhat eroded, and the local actors were waiting for a commitment 
from the central government. To speed up the development of the Central Station area, in 1999 the City of 
The Hague decided to separate the core area around the Central Station from the project and develop this 
area first, apart from the rest of Hoog Hage. The local government asked for financial support from the 
national government. In 2000, the public and private partners elaborated the plan further, and the City 
Council took a preliminary formal decision on the area (the so-called Voorbereidingsbesluit [‘Preparatory 
Decision’]). In July, the national government granted money to the project from its Key Project budget. 
model, light rail infrastructure and motorways are to be moved underground, while the long-distance rail 
infrastructure is maintained at its current position.  
The period after the initial document was presented was used to consult with the societal actors. In June 
2001 the City managers and national authorities presented an initial document outlining procedures for 
further decision-making. According to public law, they initiated a formal legal procedure (MER), which 
was intended to result in a definite public decision within two years. One of basic principles of this 
procedure was that the motorway should be located underground. Discussions on how to deal with the 
railway and light rail infrastructure continued. In February 2002, the City Council reaffirmed its prefer-
ence for the dock model. 
In the meantime, various forms of interaction surrounding parts of the project continued. In November 
2001 a consortium consisting of the ING Bank, ABN-AMRO Bank and NS signed an agreement with the 
City Council for the development of a ‘Business Park’ (the Drenthe Park) in the area. Bilateral agree-
ments were concluded with the University in this area and with the RAI Conference Committee. In terms 
of partnership, we may conclude that the South Axis is a good example of the type of cooperation that 
starts with high ambitions in terms of strategic alliances and joint decision-making, but in reality develops 
towards a network structure in which traditional roles are played and cooperation is based on bilateral 
agreements.  
 
Case 3: Hoog Hage, the Central Station project in The Hague 
Hoog Hage is a continuation of an earlier project that was supported by the national government in 1993. 
It involves the restructuring of the area around the Central Railway Station. This project can also be seen 
as part of a large-scale inner-city renovation project that had been begun in the nineties. In 1999, the 
decision was taken to first develop a small area of 400 by 400 meters around the station. This ‘Central 
Quadrant project’ is part of the Hoog Hage/Central Station project, which in turn is part of the inner-city 
regeneration project. This area holds a large concentration of offices (mainly national government 
Ministries and some cultural institutions such as the National Library and Museum of Literature). Every 
day, some 350,000 travellers use the train, metro or bus in and around the Central Station. In 2002, a 
growth is estimated towards 120,000 square meters of office space, 50,000 square meters of residential 
housing, 30,000 square meters for other functions, and 2,500 new parking spaces.  
In the course of 1996, the main actors involved in the Central Station project set up an informal steering 
group to discuss initiatives for constructing plans for the area. This steering group commissioned a firm of 
architects to draw up the first draft of a master plan for the central station area. All the actors approved the 
draft of the master plan, which was presented in early 1997, and in June 1997 the cooperating public and 
private actors, the City of The Hague, WBN, Dutch Rail and railway stations, and ‘Multi Vastgoed’ (a 
developer) signed a covenant in which they affirmed their support for the master plan and agreed to carry 
out further research into the spatial and financial feasibility of the plan. The plan was also given the status 
of Key Project. 
Although several actions were taken, including an unsuccessful attempt to set up a participating company 
to organise the joint financial contributions of public and private actors, no final plan had yet been 
realised by the end of 1998. The actors reiterated their statement of intention in late 1998, and found that 
one of the actors in the area who had been excluded, the Shell Pension Fund which held a position on the 
ground, opposed the plans that had been made so far. After intense consultation, the Pension Fund agreed 
to at least cooperate in the joint planning process until late 1999. 
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The City Council approved a project document outlining the total program for the area and the various 
facilities. On this basis and on the basis of various architectural drawings, the partners together began 
working on a new master plan for the Central Station area. By now, the county government (Stadsgewest 
Haaglanden) had also become involved. 
In early 2002, a draft master plan was finished and presented to the City Council. The City and the NS, 
Multi Vastgoed and Babylon, which represented the shops and cinema next to the Central Station, signed 
an agreement confirming their support of the program outlined by the master plan. The private actors 
were the first to develop a number of projects within the area. The master plan also regulated the phases 
of redevelopment and enforced arrangements regarding financing and organisation of the project. In fact, 
the 2002 agreement can be seen as an update of the 1997 agreement, but more solidly underpinned by 
financial obligations and organisational arrangements. 
 
Conclusion: long-term decision-making, separate responsibilities and hesitant  
commitments 
If we look at the course of action taken in these three cases we can draw a number of conclusions (which 
are confirmed by other studies of PPP projects in the Netherlands, viz.: Van der Ham/ Koppenjan (eds.), 
2002).  
First of all, that regeneration processes are long and complex. This pattern can be seen in every inten-
sively used urban area, especially around railway stations. This complexity has to do with the high 
amount of ambitions that have to be met in these areas. Especially in Utrecht, the conflict between 
economic and mobility needs and values of scale and liveability is intense and has even changed the 
political landscape in the course of several years. In order to meet the high societal ambitions in the areas 
of economy, mobility and liveability, it is recognised that cooperation is needed between the various 
actors: between different governments, between public and private owners and investors and also with 
societal groups and citizens. 
Partnership is often advocated as an arrangement that is needed in order to create a high-quality and 
synergetic regeneration process. However, if we look at the forms of cooperation that were present in 
each of the three cases, we must come to the conclusion that what results from this are loosely linked 
forms of interaction and bilateral negotiations in which all parties play their traditional roles. 
Public actors (mostly city governments) are still the ones who take the planning initiative and consult 
private actors on individual elements of the project. While more intensive or formalised forms of coopera-
tion have been attempted – for instance in the early stages of the South Axis project (the strategy group) 
or the Utrecht Centre project (in the period 1998-2000) –, they are not long-lasting even if they are 
established, and tend to dissolve over time. Partnerships are tempting arrangements due to the added 
value they can create, but in practice, a bilateral agreement is the most that parties can deal with. 
As a consequence, the concept of an integrated and combined investment program is often converted into 
a set of loosely-linked projects of an individual nature. ‘Synergy’ and ‘joint development’ are nice words 
in theory, but they are not actually achieved within the existing fragmented decision-making arenas. 
All parties are far too preoccupied with their own procedures and internal issues to be able to act as 
partners. Or, to put it more solemnly: institutional principles with regard to procedures, accountability and 
rewards facilitate fragmented decision-making much more than they facilitate joint decision-making. 
 
 
4.  ACTORS AND INTERDEPENCENCIES IN PPP 
 
Every scholar of public administration is familiar with implementation studies (Pressman, Wildavsky, 
1973) and knows that it is not easy to convert ambitions into actions. Furthermore, the actual implementa-
tion of the ambitions that are formulated at the national level has to be performed by local actors: munici-
palities, local interest groups, and private investors. This is vividly borne out by the cases we have 
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described, which raises the question of which actors are involved in PPP projects and how their positions 
and interdependencies influence the cooperation process that we described in the previous section. 
 
Actors in the three PPP projects: diversity and complex interdependencies 
Table 1 gives an inventory of the parties involved in the three described key projects. We have distin-
guished between key players and peripheral actors. Key players are those who are formally involved in 
the process and/or interact intensively about substance and process of the project. These actors have 
signed a formal agreement about the content of the plan, participate in consultations and meetings, and are 
members of specially set up arrangements (such as a steering group). Peripheral actors are those who have 
an interest in one way or another, but are not systematically included in the interaction. They are part of 
the institutional context in which projects are embedded.  
 
Table 1: Actors in the three Key Projects 
 
Categories of actors The Hague 
Central 
Station 
Utrecht 
Centre 
Amsterdam 
South Axis 
Interests (sometimes represented by actors in 
the category mentioned). 
Key players      
National government  X X X Ministries of V&W [Traffic and Waterways] (high 
speed railway, regional railways, modal split); 
RWS [National Water Management] (parking 
standards, accessibility); EZ [Economic Affairs] 
(business environment), BIZA [Internal Affairs] 
(urban policies); VROM/RPD [National Planning 
Agency] (Compact City) 
Municipalities/inner-
municipal units 
X X X Landowners, public duties and investors (UCP) 
National Rail Real Estate  X X X Owner, developer, and representative of other 
transporters (UCP) and/or sister companies in 
Dutch Railways 
Railway stations X   Economic owner 
Shopping Investments 
Netherlands (SIN) 
X X  Investor and owner (of shop provisions) 
KN Jaarbeurs [Trade Fair]  
 
 
X  
 
Owner, user 
Multi Real Estate  X X  Developer (and Jaarbeurs partner) 
ING Real Estate  X X (land)owner (WBN partner), financier, developer 
ABN/AMRO Bank   X Owner, user, financier and investor 
FGH Bank    X Former owner and expert 
 
Peripheral actors     
 
ING/Q-Park 
 
X   
 
Owner Central Parking 
Shell Retirement Funds  X   Co-owner Foundation Trust BV 
Advisor/consultant   X X Process management, advisor for banks, urban 
architectural coordinator etc. 
OV-Firms X X X Users 
WTC [World Trade Centre] 
RAI [Conference Centre] 
and VU [University] 
  X Users and owners of land and buildings  
Architects X X X Experts 
Shop owner associations X X X Users/Interested parties (usually through represen-
tation) 
Home owner associations  X X X Users/interested parties (usually involved through 
representation) 
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Key players will have to consider the possibility that peripheral actors may intervene suddenly or that the 
actions of these peripheral actors may have a substantial impact on the development of the area. One 
example is the UCP case, where opposition to the project resulted in the new political party of Leefbaar 
Utrecht, which played an important role. In other words, peripheral actors are not without power, but they 
only manifest themselves systematically in those arenas where public and private parties meet to restruc-
ture and develop an area. We should note that Table 1 is especially informative about the perceived 
centrality of the policy arena surrounding the concept of the New Key Project. Companies that want to 
settle in this area are seen as peripheral actors, since they are only marginally involved in the debate on 
the key projects. In terms of the conceptual scheme presented earlier, we could also say that they operate 
in different arenas.  
This complexity of actors and arenas is an essential feature of the PPP projects. Time and again, adjacent 
arenas and policy games can be constructed that are equally central if we define the subject in a slightly 
different manner. If, for instance, we were to ask why the South Axis, the UCP or the Rotterdam Central 
Station offer development opportunities, the central arena would be the arena in which decision-making 
about the location is done by individual companies. The distinction presented in Table 1, however, is 
useful for describing the arena in which the New Key Projects play a central role. 
 
PPP: Mutual dependency within networks 
Table 1 illustrates that a series of different actors is involved. Some of them are even involved in different 
key projects. This is true not only of various actors within the public conglomerate that we define as being 
covered by the concept of national government, but also for certain (semi-) private actors such as the 
National Rail Real Estate, WBN, Multi Real Estate and ING Real Estate.4  This multiple inclusion in 
various arenas is an important institutional feature of PPP. 
Although projects are generally implemented at the local level, intense relations exist with the national 
government. A fixed group of potential players is involved. Only a limited number of private actors such 
as financiers and developers possess the knowledge and means to engage in these large projects. Oppor-
tunities for replacing public or private participants are limited (Scharpf, 1978). This makes actors mutu-
ally dependent. Even after a failure occurs, as in the case of the UCP parties, cautious interactions begin 
again. While this interdependency is the reason for the cooperation, at the same time it may lead to inertia 
and blocking. Parties have little concern about sanctions for uncooperative behaviour since they them-
selves are indispensable to a large degree. Also, a kind of ‘vendetta effect’ may occur where parties, and 
especially the individual representatives of parties, decide to settle accounts and even out the cost of a 
previous project.  
Finally, we may point at the fact that in terms of interests several parties are missing from the key 
projects. Decision-making is dominated by real-estate parties, while parties responsible for infrastructure 
and logistics play a more peripheral role. However, the use of their investments and space is crucial to the 
success of the key projects. So, even though the existing interaction already raises problems, the arenas 
should be expanded even further. 
  
 
5.  INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PPP 
 
In PPP the traditional distinction between public and private actors is dissolved, while at the same time 
cooperation in both spheres becomes necessary. But even within the public and the private spheres, actors 
from different networks and arenas must link their efforts in order to achieve the surplus value desired by 
all of them. This means that there are various ways in which they can clash with different institutional 
regimes. 
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Parties in PPP and their (network) backgrounds: interconnected arenas and networks 
The actors from the key projects contribute different means and play different roles. They also originate 
from different networks. Table 2 provides an overview.  
 
Table 2: Groups of Actors in PPP Projects and backgrounds 
 
ACTORS MEANS  ROLES BACKGROUND 
National govern-
ment 
Legal authorities 
Financial means 
Political legitimacy 
Sector-bound policy initiators 
(particularly VROM, EZ, 
V&W) and policy interests, 
financial backers  
From central, often sectoral net-
works, sector policy interests 
(accessibility, economic vitality, 
etc.)  
Local governments Legal authorities (zoning 
plans, etc.), land positions 
Initiator, local process monitor From local networks, primary local 
interests  
Private owners of 
offices and services  
Ownership, possibility to 
provide extra investment, 
threat to leave  
In case of profits, this group 
can generate private invest-
ments; in case of losses, this 
group will offer opposition or 
demand high compensation  
This often involves parties who 
have their own networks in one area 
(e.g., banking, insurance, transport, 
etc.) 
 
Developers Expertise/capacity 
Land/ownership positions 
(sometimes) 
Organiser of building processes 
aimed at quick profits  
Operate nationally and participate in 
urban expansion and development 
networks  
Private financiers Financial means Setting aside means to obtain 
short-term profits or generate 
good returns in the longer run 
Participate in upper regional net-
works and are focused on realising 
attractive profits and an adequate 
investment portfolio  
Advisors Expertise and relative 
disinterest 
 
Often, a role as project leader 
or mediator, co-ordinator, 
advisor, or contractor 
 
Do not belong to a specific interest 
network, but maintain crucial pro-
fessional networks 
 
Interested parties; 
quality-of-life 
interests  
Support/political pressures 
/legal procedures  
Often emerge to criticise 
projects 
 
From local networks, have an inter-
est as users or as owners of space 
Interested parties, 
economic interests 
Veto powers, support of a 
possible integral approach 
(e.g., shop owners) 
Come into view either as critics 
or as clients 
From company networks, where 
certain developments are considered 
necessary while others are seen as 
threatening 
 
 
Various problems are created by the fact that actors originate from different networks. We note two 
prominent problems: the necessity of linking decisions that are taken within the various involved net-
works and arenas, and the demarcation lines that exist between the various domains. 
In all key projects, decisions involve housing and environmental planning issues as well as transport 
issues. The first of these are handled by the environmental network, in which the Ministry of Housing and 
Environmental Planning (VROM) also plays a prominent role. The second type of issues, i.e. transport 
issues, are dealt with by the transport network, where the Ministry of Transport holds a prominent 
position. In both networks, various arenas are present in which the decisions are taken that are important 
to the key projects.  
One example that figures prominently in all three cases is an arena within the transport network where 
decisions are taken about a light railway system between the cities of Amsterdam, Utrecht, The Hague 
and Rotterdam. Decisions taken in this arena (the ‘BOR’ arena) are important to the projects because they 
create possibilities (and set conditions and limitations) not just for better transport but also for improve-
ment of the central stations in those areas. But most of the actors in the key project do not participate in 
this arena. And in this way we can find many arenas where important decisions are taken. Each time the 
initiators and managers of the three key projects have to ask themselves: in which arenas can I participate 
and what compensation does this bring in return for the time it costs me? But connecting all these 
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decisions is also very time-consuming and requires a lot of managing skills. Much can go wrong and does 
go wrong when trying to establish these connections, as evaluation research to environmental planning 
has shown (Werkgroep vijfde nota [‘Fifth Memorandum Working Group’], 2000; VROM, 2001) 
 
Separation: the problem of domains 
The fact that decisions in PPP projects have to be linked to various different actors, arenas and networks 
constitutes not only an organisational problem in terms of management, but also a domain problem. Rules 
that help to determine and demarcate land ownership, or rules that regulate interactions (such as providing 
information, conflict management, access, etc.) can differ between networks, can conflict with one 
another, or can simply block interaction with actors from other networks (viz. Ostrom, 1986; Klijn, 2001). 
Thus there is a clear description of what falls under the competency of a Ministry (although competency 
conflicts between ministries are frequent, so the rules are not entirely unambiguous). The lines of demar-
cation between different sector networks or departments may also cause problems for PPP projects.  
However, strict demarcation lines between actors also act as barriers against cooperation, since actors are 
unwilling to relinquish their own domain or do not want to forge links with other actors, since this would 
not fit in with the pattern of their own domains which has developed over time. Hence, in the UCP-case 
WBN believes that it is normal for existing investments in Hoog Catherijne (traditionally the domain of 
WBN) to be more important than the development of investments around the Jaarbeurs. As a conse-
quence, WBN initially allowed talks about opening new shopping areas around the Jaarbeurs – on which 
basis the Jaarbeurs agreed to invest in the public space – but ultimately the WBN torpedoed these plans, 
claiming that the development of shops in the Jaarbeurs area fell under the domain of the WBN. The 
Jaarbeurs project was unable to continue after this and was forced to break off its cooperation with the 
municipality. In the Hoog Hage case, similar problems of domain demarcation can be seen. 
The same thing occurred on the other side. VROM refused to take any risks and responsibilities in the 
cooperation. Instead, they wished to subsidise and impose rules: the traditional tasks and instruments of 
their own domain. Furthermore, they wanted to impose unilateral substantive conditions, but did not care 
to invest in thinking about reasonable solutions in the light of various different interests falling outside its 
direct domain. As long as the internal logic of private parties (in this case the WBN) and of public parties 
(in this case VROM) continues to dominate, partnership will be hard to achieve. 
 
In short, the institutional fragmentation of PPP projects may create enormous barriers to cooperation. It 
enhances the complexity of decision-making and calls for a huge managerial effort, while at the same 
time these management efforts are hampered by domain demarcations.  
 
 
6. INSTITUTIONAL ROLES AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR 
 
In the cases under study, we see a repeated pattern of strategies. Although actors do get together to 
undertake collective action in the beginning, often this action does not result in a collective outcome. 
Either actors hesitate to commit themselves to each other or – and sometimes both of these things happen 
– joint efforts and the integral character of projects become disconnected at a later stage. In that case the 
outcome is a clearer separation of responsibilities in which each of the (mainly public and private) actors 
concentrates on his own task. This also results in a dominant pattern in which the relationship is organised 
according to a contract relation rather than a partnership relation. In this section we focus on the differ-
ences in values and in resulting strategies, which are related to the institutional factors we analysed above, 
as an explanation for this pattern. 
 
A Principal Division between Value Systems: Jacobs Revisited 
The cases we have outlined as well as other studies (viz. Van der Ham/Koppenjan (eds.), 2002) show how 
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Here we touch upon one of the core issues of PPP. Below, in Table 3, we have attempted to refine the 
tension between the core business and the resulting strategies of public and private actors, and the 
consequences of this for the PPP projects (and cooperative arrangements) desired by actors. The table is 
meant as an instrument for further research. Following Jacobs’ ideal types, we have assumed that the 
difficult it is to change role conceptions and domain demarcations. It will remain difficult to break 
through the public-private distinction for a long time. 
Some authors even believe that the division between public and private domain is impossible to dissolve, 
pointing out a difference in value patterns. Jacobs (1992, p. 32) describes the public and private domain as 
two ethical systems with different ‘moral syndromes’. The public domain is characterised by the guardian 
syndrome, the private domain by the commercial syndrome. Typical of the guardian syndrome are values 
such as: avoiding trade and commerce, striving for discipline and loyalty and respecting tradition and 
hierarchy. There is also a certain degree of fatalism, linked to a strong devotion to the task at hand. The 
commercial syndrome is characterised by values such as: avoiding violence, achieving agreements on a 
voluntary basis, honesty and competitiveness. Other values such as optimism and appreciation of initia-
tive are also part of this syndrome. According to Jacobs there are two types of survival: tasks that belong 
to the state, and trading linked to the market system. The two moral syndromes each belong to a pattern of 
survival; they are survival systems and cannot be merged without a problem. In fact, you could say that 
they are mutually exclusive.  
Jacobs is not the only one to claim that the public and private spheres are two entirely different value 
systems and cannot be merged. Other authors also doubt the survival rate of hybrid organisations or 
hybrid constructions. Simon (1990) translates this into a distinction between task- and market organisa-
tions. A task organisation receives an assignment from a principal together with the means to fulfil that 
task. The values on which such an organisation is based are, according to Simon: obedience, the absence 
of a profit motive, loyalty, and an orientation toward continuity, comparable to Jacobs’ guardian syn-
drome. The market organisation does not have a principal, but it does have clients. Such an organisation is 
dominated by values such as: respect for contracts, appreciation of zeal and initiative, etc. These values 
are similar to the values of Jacobs’ commercial syndrome. Simon assumes that mixed types between task 
and market organisations will not be stable and will evolve in a particular direction. Thus, a task organi-
sation that starts generating its own income and seeking clients will eventually evolve into a complete 
market organisation. 
The conclusion might be that PPP is doomed to fail. PPP attempts to combine two value patterns that 
cannot and should not be combined. Furthermore, two conflicting organisational principles are linked. 
The question remains, however, whether Jacobs’ basis of historical analysis will remain valid in the 
future. Even if intertwined systems have been impossible and undesirable in the past, is it not possible 
that such systems will be at an advantage in future due to changing circumstances? 
 
Strategies of Cooperation between Public and Private Parties 
Although the reflections of Jacobs and Simon are somewhat extreme, they do provide a basis for theoris-
ing about public-private cooperation. They emphasise the need for coherence between organisational 
structures (to be designed) and organisational values (that prevail and can be only partially influenced). 
The inability to create new forms of coherence could explain why PPP is so difficult to realise and why 
attempts at cooperation often result in organisational divisions, while attempts at regulation result in 
contracting-out procedures and contracts. 
Such procedures and contracts fit in with the value patterns of the organisations involved and demand the 
least amount of adaptation on the part of these organisations. Public actors generally feel that they are in 
control if a contracting-out construction is used, and thus run a limited risk. This fits in with their value 
patterns of hierarchy and the primacy of the public interest. They do not have to adapt their internal 
organisation and can provide the political arena with a clear decision. Private actors run no more risks 
than they are accustomed to. They can work with a type of organisation (contract) that is familiar to them 
and they can acquire the contract in a competitive effort. 
 
14
values of public parties will result in strategies aimed at controlling the substance of projects and mini-
mising financial risks. This involves a very specific way of looking at risks. Public parties do not mind 
spending money, not even when it generates few returns. But public opinion should be taken into account 
if there are expectations of costs and benefits, which subsequently fail to be realised. A recent example is 
the auction of the UMTS frequency bands. Because expectations were raised through foreign auctions, the 
Cabinet was severely criticised for disappointing returns, even though in the past the government gave 
away these types of services almost for free and no one was bothered by it. In such cases, political 
accountability is without mercy.5 Thus, in the public domain the management of expectations is an 
important task when engaging in PPP. 
The values of private actors lead to strategies where the certainty of obtaining a market share and profits 
are central, but where there is also an emphasis on seizing the opportunity. However, there is an important 
difference in the public sector. A government can tolerate losses as long as they are tolerated by its 
political and public electoral support base. Private enterprises are judged by results and therefore cannot 
hide behind symbolism. For them, it is the market mechanism that is without mercy. 
 
Table 3:  Relation between the Core Businesses, Values and Strategies of  
Public and Private Actors 
 
 Public actors Private actors Tension 
Core business Objectives: (sectoral) public objectives 
Continuity: political conditions 
 
Objectives: realising profits 
Continuity: financial conditions 
 
Different problem definiti-
ons: political risks in expec-
tations versus market risks 
in annual figures 
Values Loyalty 
Devoted to a self-defined public cause 
Controllability of process and approach 
(political/social) 
Emphasis on risk avoidance and pre-
venting expectations 
 
Competitive 
Devoted to consumer preferences 
Controlled by shareholders on the 
basis of results 
Emphasis on market opportunities 
and risks and innovations 
 
Government reluctant in 
process versus private party 
reluctant with knowledge 
Government reluctant in 
result versus private parties 
reluctant with their own 
effort 
Strategies  Search for ways to guarantee substan-
tive influence (primacy of the public) 
Minimising expectations and insecurity 
of implementation costs 
 
Search for certainties to produce  
and/or obtain a contract 
Minimising political risks and organ-
isational costs as a consequence of 
public ‘viscosity’ 
 
Confrontation leads to a mu-
tual ‘locking-up’ of agree-
ments and thus to tried and 
tested types of cooperation 
(contracts) 
Consequences 
for PPP 
Emphasis on a limitation of risks and 
on agreements that lead to agreed 
procedures and public dominance 
 
Emphasis on certainty of market 
share and profit, which leads to an 
expectant attitude and limited invest-
ments until the moment when the 
contract is acquired 
The creation of added value 
through cross-border inter-
action is not realised  
 
As long as no contract is awarded, private actors wait. To put somewhat more cynically, we could say that 
they have learned that government would rather do nothing than do something innovative. Private parties 
have also learned that it is better from them to provide standard solutions at reliable profits rather than 
present new (improved) solutions which may lead to unrest. A good example is the corrugated asphalt on 
highways – developed some time ago –which is safer when it rains, but slicker when it is icy. The media 
made a substantial fuss about this, which resulted in a political risk. 
We can conclude that a major reason that partnerships frequently take on a highly contractual form that 
aims at a clear division of responsibilities and risks lies in the relation between the institutional division of 
the private and public sector, which is reflected by the various core businesses, value patterns and 
strategies chosen by the actors. Since these strategy patterns are closely related to the institutional 
characteristics of PPP projects, they are not easily overcome.  
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7. PPP: THE RIGHT FORM AT THE WRONG MOMENT? 
 
We have found that the explanation for the inability to develop partnerships lies in a combination of three 
factors: complexity of actor composition, institutional factors and the strategic choices of public and 
private actors. 
The complex actor composition, i.e. the fact that many actors are involved, make PPP difficult and 
complex and also increase the risks of these decision-making processes and pose a difficult managerial 
challenge for the actors. Institutional fragmentation and the complexity of decision-making in PPP add to 
this. Institutional complexity – the fact that PPP has to connect the decisions from various arenas and 
networks – increases the risks for actors and the chance of failure. This is enhanced by the domain 
demarcations between networks and between actors, which make joint decision-making difficult and 
make it possible, and tempting, for actors to split up the project and divide the responsibility. 
After all, a contractual division of responsibilities takes into account the existing institutional fragmenta-
tion (both between the public and private spheres as well as within each of them) and is a familiar, tried 
and tested form to manage public-private relations. And splitting the project up in sections reduces the 
complexity of the decision-making process. Furthermore, contracts reduce risks and act as a guarantee 
against opportunism (Williamson, 1996). 
This is reflected and enhanced by the strategic logic of the public and private actors on which we have 
elaborated in section 5. Public actors want to minimise expectations and insecurity of implementation 
costs and want to be sure of having a political influence on the projects. Private actors look for certainties 
to produce and minimise political risks. Together they produce a situation in which they focus on a 
separation of responsibilities and emphasise contractual relations. 
 
Such a strict contractual division does not benefit projects which require innovation and the development 
of high-quality products. Also, the realisation of products and services of an integral nature – a desire that 
has frequently been expressed by the actors involved – is something that can rarely be accomplished. 
Here, strong tension is visible between the explicit wishes of actors and views on the necessity of inte-
grated high-quality products and services in a network society on the one hand, and the existing institu-
tional structures and chosen strategies of actors on the other hand (Kenniscentrum, 1998, 1999, Council 
for Traffic and Water Management, 1998; SER, 1999). 
Perhaps PPP is a logical arrangement that will be needed in a network society where knowledge and 
resources are distributed over various actors. Such a new society, however, has not yet been accepted by 
the present management. PPP is simply an example of the right proposal at the wrong time. Real partner-
ships do not (yet?) fit in with the institutional rules, roles and habits based on a public-private division at 
the beginning of the 21st century. 
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Ministry of Finance (1998), Final report of the MDW Working Party on Market and Government, The Hague.  
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NOTES 
1 Not all surplus value is synergy (although the reverse is true). Simple savings of transaction costs (such as 
quicker permit granting or organizational efficiency) create surplus value but not synergy. 
2  Due to lack of space, we discuss this theoretical perspective only briefly. This perspective is described 
elsewhere in more detail (viz. Kickert/Klijn/Koppenjan, 1997; Klijn/Koppenjan, 2000; Teisman, 2000) 
3 The data is partly based on a case study by J. Verbart in G.R. Teisman, Ed., Ruimtelijk Procesmanagement 
en Meervoudig Ruimtegebruik [Spatial Process Management and a Multiple Use of Space] (2001), Delft, Eburon.  
4 Here, we will not take into account that several large municipalities are simultaneously involved in various 
large investment projects and are thus entangled in conflicts of interest. 
5 Now that profits in other countries have fallen and the higher profits in Germany and the U.K. are the 
exception rather than the rule, the political consequences are likely to be less pronounced. Hence it is not so much 
the inherent quality of the auction as the comparison that counts. 
